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RECENT CASES
other courts of the state. Presumably a standard by which the court may
determine if the Commissioner had adequately shown a state decision to be
inaccurate, thus requiring the federal court to determine state law itself, will
have to be developed through case law. Abstract, theoretical characterizations of
a standard such as this are of little value without concrete examples of its appli-
cation to facts from which guidelines may be drawn by the courts.
Ideally, this "presumption" favoring a state court determination would
protect and consider both interests involved here. Inaccurate state court deter-
minations would not be followed by the federal court, but the advantages of
using the state court decision would not be ignored without good reason. The
expertise of the state court vis-a-vis state law would be utilized, there would
be as little federal interference with the administration of state law as possible,
and the uniformity between federal and state law would increase. In addition,
knowledge that an inaccurate state court determination can be ignored would
have a two-fold effect on persons contemplating an action in a state court:
first, it would discourage actions brought solely to avoid taxes which have no
rational basis in state law, and second, it would encourage those with sound
cases, since the federal court would not ignore the state decision unless it was
shown to be clearly inaccurate under relevant state law.
Thus, it would seem that a presumption favoring the accuracy of state court
determinations would, by slightly limiting the Bosch rule, result in an approach
that better protects all the interests involved.
MICHAEL R. MCGEE
LABOR LAW-NLRB's LACK OF REMEDIAL POWER IN A RUNAWAY
PLANT SITUATION
Finding adequate remedies to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act1 is one of the major problems facing the National Labor Relations
Board. A recent case, Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.)2'
focuses sharply on one aspect of this problem. The employer, Garwin Corpora-
tion, was found by the Board to have moved its operations from New York to
Florida to avoid dealing with the union representing its employees in New
York. The Board ordered the employer to offer the New York employees, either
reinstatement with back pay and moving expenses (if the employer remained
at the Florida location), or reimbursement of income lost from the date of dis-
charge until similar employment was found. The employer was also required
to bargain with the union irrespective of the location chosen and the union's
1. National Labor Relations Act, § 10c, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1964) empowers the Board "to take such affirmative action . . 'as will effectuate the
policies of the act."
2. 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).'
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re-establishment of majority support. However, should the union fail to gain
majority support at the new plant, any contract negotiated between the em-
ployer and the union would bar a representative petition by the employees
for only one year, as opposed to the normal three year period., In denying
enforcement to that portion of the Board's order which required the employer
to bargain with the union at the new plant, even though the union did not
have majority support, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, one
member dissenting, held, the Board had exceeded its authority because
such an order was punitive rather than remedial, and impinged upon the right
of the Florida employees to select their own bargaining agent.4
When an employer relocates his operations for the purpose of undermining
unionization, he commits an "unfair labor practice."6' In Textile Workers v.
Darlington Mfg. Co.,6 where an employer terminated his operations due to anti-
union motivation, the Supreme Court held that an employer had a right to
terminate his business for any reason, including anti-union bias, but his rights
are limited when his action is less than a complete termination of business. For
example, an employer would violate the Act if, due to anti-union motivation,
he were to terminate part of his business, transfer work to another plant, or
open a new plant to replace the closed facility.7 In determining whether an
employer's action went beyond the protected scope of termination, the prime
consideration is whether the employer had any business interests, whether or not
in the same line of business, which would benefit as a result of his action dis-
couraging unionization.6 When such action is found to be other than a com-
plete termination, the employer will have violated the Act if he had anti-union
3. The contract-bar rule is a principal by which a contract negotiated between the
employer and the union is held to bar a petition challenging the majority status of the
union for a given period. Originally the period was one year but it has now been extended to
three years. The basic policy of the rule is to insure stability, at the cost of complete repre-
sentativeness.
4. Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
5. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965); NLRB v. Winchester
Electronics, Inc., 295 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1961); Sidele Fashions, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 NLRB 547 (1961), enjorced sub
nom., Garment Workers v. NLRB 305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962); Industrial Fabricating, Inc.,
119 NLRB 162, 41 LRRM 1038 (1957), enforced sub nom., NLRB v. MacKenish, 272
F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959); California Footwear Co., 114 NLRB 765, 37 LRRM 1037 (1955),
enforced in part sub nom., NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Brown Truck
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 NLRB 999, 32 LRRM 1580 (1953).
See also: Daykin, Runaway Shops: The Problem and Treatment, 12 Lab. L.J. 1025
(1961); Comment, Labor Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1100 (1964).
6. Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 270 (1965).
7. Id. at 272.
8. Id. at 275-76:
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being closed for anti-
union reasons (1) have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated
with or engaged in the same line of commercial activity as the closed
plant, of sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping a benefit from
the discouragement of unionization in that business; (2) act to close their plant
with the purpose of producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship to the
other business which makes it realistically forseeable that its employees will fear
that such business will also be closed down if they persist in organizational activi-
ties, we think that an unfair labor practice has been made out.
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rather than economic motivations However, the mere existence of economic
justification will not always absolve the employer, for "when interference with
section 7 rights [to organize] outweighs the business justification for the em-
ployer's action"' 0 section 8(a) (1) will be held to have been violated. Other
cases establish that while an employer has the right to relocate for economic
reasons, he has a duty to give the union sufficient notice of such plans and to
bargain with the union over the relocation and its effect on the employees at
the original location."1
In dealing with unfair labor practices, the Board has been given the
power "to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of"' 2
the National Labor Relations Act. The courts have recognized that in order to
achieve a unified national labor policy, the Board must be given broad discretion,
and the choice of remedies to effectuate these policies are the special province
of the Board, subject only to limited judicial review.' 3 The presumption favoring
the Board's choice of remedy is strong: " [I] t should stand unless it can be shown
that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can
fairly be said to effectuate the act.' 14
Judicial interpretation of the Act has established that this power is
solely remedial and does not extend to punitive action.' 5 The main reasons
suggested for this limitation are, first, the words "affirmative action," which in
themselves suggest that Congress intended that the action taken was to be
remedial rather than punitive,1 and second, that were Congress to delegate so
drastic a power to the Board, it would have been more specific and would have
more closely defined the nature and scope of such power.17 The remedial power
can be defined as the power to issue an order seeking to effectuate the national
labor policy by restoring the status quo ante, i.e., to recreate as nearly as possible
9. Id. at 275.
10. Id. at 268-69.
11. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Lewis,
246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 NLRB 999 (1952);
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 138 NLRB 550 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir,
1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
12. National Labor Relations Act § 10c, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160c (1964).
13. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1952);
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943); NLRB v. Consolidated Mach.
Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 824 (1947).
14. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943).
15. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); Local
60, Brotherhood of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651 (1961).
16. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235 (1938) (Wherein the Court
stated that "this authority to order affirmative action does not go so far as to confer a
punitive jurisdiction," Id. at 235. "The Power to command affirmative action is remedial,
not punitive." Id. at 236.).
17. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10 (1940) (where the Court stated:
"Had Congress been intent upon such a program [i.e., of penal sanction] we cannot
doubt that Congress would have expressed its intent and would itself have defined its
retributive scheme.").
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the situation existing prior to the commission of the unfair labor practice.18
Furthermore, even if the Board's order is found to be remedial, and not a
patent attempt to achieve ends which do not effectuate national labor policies,
the courts have retained the power to strike an order which so disregards the
particular circumstances as to become oppressive. 19
It has been very difficult to fashion a meaningful remedy in the "runaway
plant" cases. 20 The clear policy is that an employer should not be allowed to
undermine the collective organization of employees by relocating his operations
for that sole purpose, or by refusing to bargain concerning the relocation and
its effects. 21 However, once the relocation is made the Board is faced with the
difficult task of fashioning a remedy which will make the injured parties whole,
while at the same time removing the impetus for such illegal activities. While
the Board has claimed the right to order an employer to return his operations
to the original location,22 it has never made such an order, and therefore it
is difficult to determine how a reviewing court might react. In general, the
Board has phrased its orders in the alternative, giving employers the option of
returning to the original location or remaining at the new site.23 If the employer
chooses to remain at the new site, the standard remedy requires the employer
to offer reinstatement plus back pay to the old employees, or, if they do not
choose to relocate, to reimburse them for income lost from the time of dis-
charge until they find similar employment.24 Another aspect of the standard
remedy, which was crucial in the Garwin case, is the order to bargain with
the old union at the new plant. When it appears that the union would regain
its majority status, there has been no difficulty in requiring the employer to
bargain with the union.2 5 A problem arises, however, when the union loses its
majority support as a result of the employer's illegal relocation or his refusal
to bargain concerning a justified relocation and its effects. Generally, where an
18. Jacob H. Klotz, 13 NLRB 746, 778 (1939), modified, 29 NLRB 14 (1941); The
Supreme Court has recognized this principle. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 236 (1938), the Court held that the Board's power was to be used "in aid ...
to restrain violations and as a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation
where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the act." See also: justice
Harlan, joined by justice Stewart, concurring in Local 60, Brotherhood of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 365 U.S. at 657, stating that the main purpose of Congress was to "enable the
Board to take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would
have existed had there been no unfair labor practice."
19. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
20. "Runaway plant" is a term generally used to designate a plant which has relocated
either for the purpose of avoiding unionization or for economic reasons.
21. See text at supra note 5.
22. Schieber Millinery Co., 26 NLRB 937, 966-67, raodified by consent in NLRB v.
Schieber, 116 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1940).
23. Id.; Sidele Fashions, Inc. v. NLRB, 133 NLRB 547, 48 LRRM 1967 (1961),
enforced sub nom. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1962).
24. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); Sidele Fashions, Inc.,
v. NLRB, 133 NLRB 547, 48 LRRM 1679 (1961), enforced sub nor., Garment Workers v.
NLRB, 305 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1962); California Footwear Co., 114 NLRB 765, 37 LRRM
1037 (1955), enforced in part sub norm., NLRB v. Lewis. 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
25. Die Supply Corp., 160 NLRB No. 99, 63 LRRM 1154 (1966).
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employer's unfair labor practice causes the union to lose its majority status,
the employer has been required to deal with the union regardless of the loss of
support.20 Such a rule has even been applied where none of the original em-
ployees remained in the bargaining unit.27 In plant relocation cases involving an
unfair labor practice, the employer has been ordered to bargain with the union
at the new plant, regardless of majority status, when the move was of so short
a distance that the union clearly could maintain its majority if the employer
continued the bargaining relationship at the new location.28 However, where
the distance was so great that it seemed unlikely that a majority of employees
would follow the union to the new plant, orders to bargain with the union,
irrespective of majority status, have not been upheld. 29 While one reason
given for this result has been the distance involved, it is important to note
that in the long-distance cases prior to Garwin the relocation was not due to
anti-union bias.30 If a lack of anti-union bias in the original decision to relocate
is an important element in the long-distance cases, the relocation cases fit within
the general rule that where the employer's unfair labor practice causes the union
to lose its majority, the employer will be required to bargain with the union, 1
since the unfair labor practice can not be said to cause the dissipation of the
union's majority unless the relocation itself was the unfair labor practice. If
the relocation was due to a proper motivation, the only unfair labor practice
which could be involved would be a refusal to bargain regarding the relocation
and its effects; such an unfair labor practice would only dissipate the union's
majority when the move was of so short a distance that, absent the unfair
labor practice, the employees would have followed the union to the new loca-
tion.
26. Perhaps, the clearest example of the application of the rule is where the employer's
unfair campaign tactics cause the union to lose an election in spite of prior evidence of
majority support, NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954). See also Franks
Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); NLRB v. Delight Bakery, Inc., 353 F.2d 344(6th Cir. 1965); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 941 (1951); NLRB v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 824 (1947).
27. Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902 f9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 961 (1965).
28. California Footwear Co., 114 NLRB 765, 37 LRRM 1037 (1955), enforced in part
sub nora. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
29. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 NLRB 480, 32 LRRM 1492 (1953), enforcement
denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir.
1961).
30. The Board itself has refused to order an employer to bargain with a union which
has lost its majority even though the employer was found to have relocated due to anti-
union bias. See Industrial Fabricating, Inc., 119 NLRB 162, 41 LRRM 1038 (1957),
enforced sub nor., NLRB v. MacKenish, 272 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1959); Brown Truck &
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 NLRB 999, 32 LRRM 1580 (1953); Sidele Fashions, Inc. v. NLRB,
133 NLRB 547, 48 LRRM 1679 (1961), enforced sub nom., Garment Workers v. NLRB,
305 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1962).
Where the Board has attempted to require an employer to engage in such bargaining
the courts have refused to enforce the order, rejecting the Board's finding that the relocation
itself was illegally motivated. See Mount Hope Finishing Co., 106 NLRB 480, 32 LRRM
1492 (1953), enforcement denied, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery,
Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
31. See text and cases cited at supra note 26.
563
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Important in any consideration of remedies for illegal plant relocation is
the right of the new employees to choose their own bargaining representative.
Clearly, this right is an important policy of the Act,3 2 but it is not absolute.
Perhaps the clearest instance of allowing other considerations to override em-
ployee free choice is in the principal of the contract-bar rule. According to this
rule, any contract negotiated between the union and the employer is held to
bar an election petition by the employees, to challenge the union's majority
status, for a given period (originally one year, now three years). 3 In such a
case the employee's right to choose his own bargaining agent is considered
subordinate to the interest in maintaining stable labor relations. This right has
also been subordinated to other considerations. Thus, an employer is required
to bargain with a union whose majority has been dissipated by the employer's
unfair labor practice. Here the policy of preserving the collective bargaining
relationship is thought to justify some infringement on the employees' section
7 rights.8 4 In one such case, Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court of
the United States has said:
Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, this remedy, as embodied in a
Board order, does not involve any injustice to the employees who may
wish to substitute for the particular union some other bargaining
agent or arrangement. For a Board order which requires an employer
to bargain with a designated union is not intended to fix a permanent
bargaining relationship without regard to new situations that may
develop. .. . But, as the remedy here in question recognizes, a bar-
gaining relationship once rightfully established must be permitted to
exist and function for a reasonable period in which it could be given a
fair chance to succeed.35
In Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, the rationale of Franks Bros. was applied
even though none of the original employees remained in the bargaining unit.80
In Garwin, Judge Burger, speaking for the majority, agreed that in moving
to Florida to avoid the New York union, the employer had committed an un-
fair labor practice. However, the court denied enforcement to that portion of the
Board's remedy which required the employer to bargain with the New York
union without regard to its majority status. Relying heavily on NLRB v. Rapid
Bindery,37 the court held that such an order can be given only where the
32. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
33. For a general discussion of the contract bar rule see Leedom, Industrial Stability
and Freedom of Choice in Collective Bargaining and the Law 36 (1959); Contract Bar and
Unite Determination at New or Relocated Plants, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 513 (1954).
34. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321, 702 (1944); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d
900 (2d Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Delight Bakery Inc., 353 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1965); Joy Silk
&ills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951);
NLRB v. Consolidated Mach. Tool Corp., 163 F.2d 376 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 332 U.S. 824
(1947); Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965); NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957).
35. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944).
36. Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 961 (1965).
37. 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
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move was of such a short distance that, absent the employer's unfair labor prac-
tice, a majority of employees would follow the union to the new location. Judge
Burger gave two reasons for this result. The order is a patent attempt to achieve
ends which do not effectuate the policies of the Act, because it violates one
of the most basic policies, i.e., the employees' free choice of bargaining agent. 38
Also, the remedy is punitive rather than remedial: "The Board is indeed
correct when it says that the purpose of a remedy must be restoration of the
status quo ...however, the basic purpose of restoring the status quo is to
redress the injury done to employees." 39 Underlying both of these reasons is the
policy of protecting employees' rights. Apparently the, court felt that the
balance which the Board struck between the policy of protecting the collective
bargaining relationship and the right of employees to choose their own bargain-
ing agent was so unreasonable that the order could not fairly be said to effectuate
the Act.
Judge McGowan, dissenting, did not view the employees' interest as con-
trolling. He argued that before the court can overturn the Board's decision, the
decision must be clearly inconsistent with the Board's statutory responsibility
to effectuate the Act. In his opinion, the balance struck in this case was not
inconsistent with such responsibility.40 In reaching this conclusion, Judge
McGowan considered the difficulty of the task of forming a meaningful remedy
for such practices, and the fact that the Board, because of its expertise and
experience, is in the best position to weigh the policies involved and determine
which remedies will best effectuate the Act.
The majority in Garwin, by denying enforcement of the Board's order to
bargain with the New York union regardless of its majority status, renders
the Board impotent in dealing with runaway plants. The order, which the
majority upholds, reimburses the employees for losses of income, or for back
pay and 'moving expenses if the employees relocate, and compels the employer
to bargain with the New York union if it regains majority support. Such an
order is completely ineffective since the availability of jobs in the area and the
fact that most of the employees were married women and unwilling to move
combine to virtually nullify the cost to the employer of compliance with the
order and prevent the union from regaining its majority. An employer wishing
to commit this unfair labor practice would merely include the inexpensive
penalty in the cost of relocation. The Board's lack of remedial power presents
a serious threat to the effectuation of a national labor policy. This has been
recognized in the staff report to a special subcommittee on labor, which is
currently engaged in a review of the National Labor Relations Act:
38. Local 57, Garment Workers v. NLRB (Garwin Corp.), 374 F.2d 295, 300, 301
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
39. Id. at 300. In footnote 22 of the majority opinion in Garwin (374 F.2d at 304) the
court brings up the possibility of redressing an injury done the union, but makes no mention
of it in the case.
40. Id. at 308.
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The problem of Labor Act enforcement lies in the fact that the
penalties and remedies are inadequate. Most of the Labor Act viola-
tions are committed knowingly and without finesse .... The remedial
order is no deterrent to the anti-union employer.... One union witness
termed the NLRB back pay order nothing but a "hunting license fee"
to kill the union.41
It is submitted that in light of this problem the courts should be careful to
give the Board sufficient room to develop meaningful remedies, a task for which
it is well suited because of its expertise and experience. The court in the
instant case was unduly harsh on the Board. It apparently restricted the
notion of status quo to a mere redressing of injury to employees.42 It is im-
possible to believe that so narrow a view of the Board's remedial power will
apply in the future. In fact, an allusion to union rights in footnote 22 of the
opinion leads one to believe that even the Garwin majority would not adhere
to so narrow a view of status quo. On the contrary, it recognized an injury to
the union which should have been remedied. In addition, the court limited the
application of the principle that an employer who dissipates a union's majority
by an unfair labor practice will be required to continue bargaining with the
union, by applying this principal only to those cases in which there has been
no change in the basic bargaining unit. The court relies heavily on Rapid
Bindery 43 but discounts the fact that an important consideration in that case
was the court's rejection of the finding that the employer had relocated for an
illegal purpose. Such a decision was not mandated by prior case law.44 The
decision was guided rather by a determination that the right of employees to
choose their own bargaining agent so outweighed the interest in protecting the
bargaining relationship that any infringement on that right was an abuse of
power by the Board. This seems an over-emphasis of the employee's right. It
has been common practice in many areas of labor law to restrict employees'
rights in favor of other policies of the Act.45 Furthermore:
The underlying purpose of this statute is industrial peace. To
allow employers to rely on employees' rights in refusing to bargain with
the formally designated union is not conducive to that end, it is inimi-
cal to it.46
In the instant case the restriction on employees' rights was to last for only one
year, and none of the restricted employees challenged the order. It seems im-
proper for the court to frustrate the efforts of the Board by allowing the
employer to flout the policies of the Act in this way.
CHARLES J. SCIBETTA
41. Hearings on H.R. 667, H.R. 976, H.R. 1134, H.R. 1548, H.R. 2038, H.R. 3355,
HR. 4278, H.R. 5918, H-R. 6080 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1966).
42. 374 F.2d 295, 300.
43. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
44. Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB, 65 LRRM 2113, 2118 (1967). (a recent
case which discusses the Garwin decision).
45. See text at supra note 32.
46. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) cited by Garwin dissent, 374 F.2d at
308 nA.
